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Operating in today's defense environment, characterized by-
uncertainty, a rapidly shrinking budget, and a leaner force
structure, it has become increasingly important that the
Military Services effectively utilize all of the scarce
resources at their disposal to the maximum extent possible.
The reserve elements of the armed forces provide various
opportunities for achieving greater economies. By providing
the active forces with professional contributory support,
while simultaneously training for specific mobilization
billets, the reserve forces comprise an asset that can be
effectively used to fill emergent needs or offset chronic
manpower or skills shortages. Ensuring that reserve elements
are fully capable of integrating into, and operating with,
their active duty counterparts is crucial in realizing
efficient, effective utilization of all available resources.
While reserve forces are represented, and participate, in
virtually every professional field and specialty found within
the Navy, some elements are currently under greater scrutiny
and are being reevaluated in light of the experiences of
Desert Shield/Storm. Top management within the Navy is
examining the various active and reserve elements with respect
to their proper place in the future Navy and Naval Reserve.
Some elements, because of the specific nature of their
missions, will be an easy sell; others will have to
demonstrate that they are a necessary and valuable asset not
only in war, but also in peacetime.
Naval Reservists serving in acquisition 1 related billets
are currently in this situation. The experiences of Desert
Shield/Storm demonstrate that it will probably take a more
extensive, and/or longer mobilization effort before
significant numbers of reserve acquisition personnel will be
needed to support increased logistics volumes. This isn't to
say that a reserve capability probably won't be needed and
shouldn't be maintained, but that the emphasis can be more
logically focused towards the value -adding support reservists
can provide today, in peacetime, rather than training for, and
justifying existence solely on, wartime mobilization billets.
Naval Reservists have long applied their sometimes extensive
active duty experience and varied civilian business
backgrounds to make meaningful and significant contributions
to the accomplishment of their gaining command's primary
mission. Contributory support takes many forms and varies
greatly from command to command.
'The term "acquisition" will be used throughout this thesis for
simplicity, and is intended to include all facets of the process
including: planning, production, contracting, contract
administration, logistics support, and other commonly categorized
fields
.
Despite the value and practicality of contributory-
support, all reserve units must continue training for their
mobilization billets. Under the umbrella of the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) , the scope of
reservist billet qualification requirements may change.
Depending upon how this act is applied to the Naval Reserve,
reserve units participating in acquisition related fields will
either continue to drill and maintain the status quo, cease to
exist entirely, or prosper in a somewhat modified structure.
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) , along with the respective
Military Services, is currently investigating this very issue.
Regardless of the outcome of their investigations into the
applicability of DAWIA, these agencies must also determine how
to most effectively use the reserve assets they currently
possess, or make the difficult and potentially costly decision
to terminate reserve participation.
B . OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this thesis is to examine various
ways in which Naval Reservists involved in the acquisition
process can be more effectively utilized. While reservists
are currently serving at a variety of commands involved in the
acquisition process, this thesis will concentrate on those
affiliated with the Defense Contract Management Command. This
examination will be made with consideration of the potential
impact of DAWIA. Although a formal determination of the Act's
applicability to reservists has not been made, any analysis of
reserve force utilization must address the Act's requirements
and its potential impact upon the Naval Reserve participants.
In preparation for the previously discussed analysis, this
researcher intends to examine the various ways in which Naval
Reservists have been, and are currently being, utilized at the
various DCMC affiliated units. Despite operating under
essentially identical mobilization training requirements, no
two units are alike in the type and scope of contributory
support they provide their respective gaining commands.
However, investigating past and current utilization of all
units involved will reveal basic evolutionary trends and
patterns in support of the most likely and desirable future
utilization.
A supporting objective of this thesis is to compile a
detailed skills profile of the reservists currently serving in
DCMC affiliated units. The profiles will address applicable
active duty, reserve, and civilian experiences in acquisition,
contracting, or related fields, and will also assess the item-
by- item accomplishment of specific DAWIA qualification
requirements pertaining to Levels I through III. These data
will facilitate generating recommendations and conclusions
concerning the possible impact of the reserve application of
DAWIA, and will aid in assessing the suitability of various
utilization options presented.
After examining the most effective utilization techniques
in light of the potential impact of DAWIA, this thesis will
investigate the desirability of a defined and stable career
path for reservists involved in acquisition. Currently, Naval
Reserve selection boards (for Supply Corps officers) tend to
place emphasis on a varied career background favoring
selection of those who are considered generalists. Spending
too much time in one type of reserve unit is looked upon as
limiting to an officer's development as he/she progresses
towards senior management positions, and may adversely affect
promotion opportunities. Many feel that the acquisition
specialist requires years to become fully qualified, unless
the officer is fortunate enough to have had significant prior
experience and formal training. This opinion is supported by
the magnitude of the traditional acquisition field
qualification requirements, and the experience and training
requirements that will be levied under DAWIA with its intent
to form a stable, professional acquisition workforce with a
defined career path. Since many reserve activities and
qualification requirements parallel active duty, it seems only
natural to look at an acquisition career path designed
especially for Naval Reservists. A career path that
incorporates the requirements for serving not only in DCMC
affiliated units, but other units involved in the acquisition
process, could broaden career opportunities while providing a
professional corps of acquisition officers.
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question that will be addressed in
this study is: "What is the most effective way in which Navy
Selected Reserve personnel can be utilized in Defense Contract
Management Command reserve units?" Subsidiary considerations
addressed in support of this question include the following:
- To what extent are Selected Reserve personnel currently
being utilized in DCMC reserve units?
- What functions can Selected Reserve personnel perform
that they are not currently performing?
How will the mandatory training requirements in
Department of Defense Directive 5000.52, Subj : Defense
Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development
Program, impact the Selected Reservists' ability to fully
qualify for their positions and perform in these billets in
the future?
- What is the impact of the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act (DAWIA) on the designation of acquisition
billets in the Selected Reserves?
- Do the present training and career paths within the DCMC
units fulfill qualification requirements of other reserve
acquisition billets?
Are there adequate controls in place to prevent
conflicts of interest between civilian employment and the
individuals duties at the DCMC units?
D . SCOPE
This thesis is a compilation of the experiences and
opinions of the Selected Reservists (SELRES) currently serving
in DCMC affiliated reserve units, along with those of their
active duty/civilian counterparts. Only Naval Reservists and
their primary counterparts were queried in this study. The
main reason for this narrow sampling is the fact that the Navy
is the only Service that maintains formal reserve unit
structures at each Defense Contract Management District (DCMD)
office and the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC)
itself. The other Services' reservists drill as Independent
Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) at these offices. A secondary
reason is that each of the 11 Naval Reserve units are
similarly structured and manned allowing a comparison of
opinions and skills profiles based on a similar training,
experience, and structural baseline. Including other Services
would require establishing a different training, experience,
and billet structure baseline for each particular Service.
Conclusions and recommendations made concerning the
utilization of the Naval Reserve units may or may not be
appropriate for the other Services.
The scope of this study focuses on the most effective
future utilization of Naval Reservists as seen from the
individual reservist's perspective. Analysis will be
supported by their past and current duties performed, and the
present experience and skills profiles of each queried
officer. Official viewpoint is incorporated when germane, and
will be a guiding factor in assessing the viability of the
recommendations
.
A significant limitation encountered concerns the
currently undecided future applicability of DAWIA
qualification requirements to reservists, and the question of
whether or not any reserve billets will be designated as part
of the acquisition workforce. Regardless of the applicability
of DAWIA to the peacetime reservist, one must consider the
possible scenarios that could occur should mobilization become
a reality. How will DAWIA be applied to not only reservists,
but the acquisition workforce in general, as acquisition
commands increase manpower to meet mobilization and surge
requirements generated by a major conflict? Any conclusions
or recommendations made must include consideration of the
impact of these decisions.
E . METHODOLOGY
This study is based on three sources of information:
questionnaires completed by Naval Reservists and their primary
gaining command counterparts, interviews with subject area
experts, and various internal documents, instructions,
letters, and point papers. The questionnaires were used as
the primary source of data for this study as this researcher
felt that the individual reserve officers actively working in
the reserve units were the best source of information for
examining future utilization possibilities. These officers
are well aware of not only their own skills and experience,
but also the conditions and constraints under which they must
work. Therefore, they should know better than anyone what
they are capable of accomplishing given the opportunity.
Interviews and literature reviews were used as secondary
sources of information in an effort to ascertain the current
status of DAWIA applicability, and to provide historical data
and insight into various aspects of the primary and subsidiary
research questions.
The questionnaire used as the basis for this thesis is
included as Appendix A. The questionnaire consists of three
parts. Part 1 solicited general information about the
reservist such as his/her civilian occupation, mobilization
billet, and years of experience. Part 2 asks for the
individual's experiences in the acquisition field, the types
of duties currently performed, the types of duties the
individual is not performing but feels qualified to perform,
and other concerns they may have. Part 3 forms a detailed
qualification profile in terms of DAWIA requirements for
Levels I through III. The questionnaire was forwarded to all
11 DCMC affiliated units, representing approximately 125
officers in total. Each officer was given a companion
questionnaire (Appendix B) to be completed by the primary
active duty military or civilian counterpart with whom he/she
interacts. The questionnaire is similar to the reserve
officer questionnaire in its Parts 1 and 2, but does not ask
for a DAWIA certification profile. The results of these
questionnaires will be presented in Chapter III and analyzed
in Chapter IV.
Interviews were conducted with a variety of officers,
reserve and active duty, involved in acquisition and/or
reserve manpower management . These interviews were intended
to provide insight, differing views, and direction for this
study, and highlighted much of the ongoing activities
currently focusing on the future roles of Naval Reservists.
There is very little general literature on this subject;
however, several position papers, letters, and memorandum do
exist that express or guide official decisions and unofficial
opinions. This information is included where applicable to
contrast or support the opinions of the SELRES responders, and
will be considered in any recommendations made.
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
To facilitate the reading of this thesis for those who may
not be familiar with certain aspects of the Naval Reserve or
the acquisition process, common terms and acronyms are defined
below:
Acquisition Corps - A component of the acquisition
workforce composed of selected personnel in the military
grades of 0-4 and above, and civilian grades of GS/GM-13 and
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above. Each Service has one Acquisition Corps as does the
Department of Defense (DODM 5000. 52M, 1991)
.
Acquisition Position - Billets (civilian or military)
having acquisition duties and falling under an acquisition
category as established by the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition) (USD (A)). These billets are not necessarily
located in organizations conducting acquisition as their
primary mission (DODM 5000. 52M, 1991).
Acquisition Workforce - All permanent military and
civilian personnel who are occupying acquisition positions,
are members of an Acquisition Corps, or are in acquisition
related programs (DODM 5000. 52M, 1991).
Critical Acquisition Position - Senior positions, as
designated by the Secretary of Defense, with significant
responsibilities in the Department of Defense acquisition
system. Any acquisition position requiring a GS/GM-14 or
above, or an 0-5 or above, is considered critical (DODM
5000. 52M, 1991)
.
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) -
Included in the Defense Authorization Act of FY 1991, Public
Law 101-510, as Title XII, this Act requires the establishment
and uniform implementation of policies and procedures for the
effective management of personnel serving in acquisition
positions
.
Gaining Command - The active military or DoD organization
that manages the reserve unit's mobilization billets and
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establishes training requirements. Reserve units are
generally named after the gaining command and perform at least
a portion of their training requirement at the command itself.
GS-1102 (Contracting) - Occupational series which includes
Contract Negotiator, Contract Specialist, Contract Termination
Specialist, Contract Administrator, Procurement Analyst,
Administrative Contracting Officer, Contract Price/Cost
Analyst, Contracting Officer, Procuring Contracting Officer,
and Termination Contracting Officer (DODM 5000. 52M, 1991).
Individual Training Plan (ITP) - An individualized
planning document which lists specific mobilization billet
training requirements and tracks accomplishment. Examples are
included as Appendix C.
Mobilization Billet - The specific billet an individual
reservist trains for, and can be expected to fill, in the
event of recall or mobilization.
Selected Reserve (SELRES) - Reservists in a drill pay
status, generally participating in 4 monthly drills and 2
weeks annual active duty for training. SELRES are considered
trained, equipped, and prepared for immediate recall upon




G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The remaining chapters of this study are as follows:
Chapter II: BACKGROUND. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter will present a brief history of the reserve
concept in general, a more detailed look at the Naval
Reserves, and background on how these forces evolved into
their present structure. It will then focus on the present
involvement of Naval Reservists in the acquisition process.
Finally, it will examine the process used in obtaining and
structuring the data to be presented.
Chapter III: PRESENTATION OF DATA COLLECTED
This chapter will present a detailed description of the
questionnaire responses. The responses will be categorized to
facilitate the development of trends, patterns, and/or a
consensus of opinion as appropriate. These categories will be
analyzed and interpreted in Chapter IV. The skills profiles
obtained from Part 3 of the questionnaire will be tabulated by
rank to present a picture of the current qualification levels
of these officers. Specific examples of reserve utilization
will be included to more vividly illustrate the data
collected.
Chapter IV: DATA ANALYSIS /INTERPRETATION
This chapter will look at the data and issues pertinent to
the primary and subsidiary research questions. The
questionnaire data, along with the results of the literature
review and interviews, will be categorized, quantified,
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compared, analyzed, and interpreted. This process will
determine trends and commonalities that can be assessed for
viability against existing and expected future policies.
Chapter V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter will draw the report together by combining
the data and resulting analysis, leading to conclusions and
recommendations for future policy and areas for possible
further study.
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II. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND METHODOLOGY
A. BACKGROUND
Reserve military forces in one form or another have been
used to augment professional, standing armies since the early
beginnings of organized warfare. America's basic concepts
regarding the application of reserve forces evolved from
England's traditional usage of locally raised militias,
commanded by the resident nobility, to man its armies
(Goldich, 1985) . Colonists came to America with this concept
entrenched, and it may have been the ready availability and
effectiveness of their informal local militias that helped
save the colonists during the various Indian wars and
uprisings (Goldich, 1985) . The militia concept proved itself
during the colonial wars and onward through the end of the War
of 1812. However, the pacification of the larger Indian
tribes reduced the need for a rapidly mobilizable reserve
force. This reality resulted in the general neglect of
organized militias that lasted until the Civil War erupted.
Until the early 1900' s, reserve forces consisted of the
various state militias. The Dick Act of 1903, the National
Defense Act of 1916, and the National Defense Act of 1920
worked to establish federally controlled reserve forces,
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primarily in support and technical specialties (Goldich,
1985) .
U.S. Naval Reserve force history dates all the way back to
the Revolutionary War. The citizen sailors of the state naval
militias performed admirably, but the continued maintenance of
their talent was not supported after the hostilities ended and
they were eventually disbanded. Despite their untimely
disestablishment, the concept of a naval militia did not
entirely disappear. When the states failed to reinstitute
their naval militias, President Jefferson proposed the
establishment of a national naval militia, but Congress failed
to appropriate the necessary funding (Kreh, 1969). This
predicament continued until the beginning of the Civil War
when Congress was left with no alternative but to authorize
funding to hire ships and crews to augment the Regular Navy.
"Abe Lincoln's Soapbox Navy" eventually comprised over 50% of
the Union's fleet (Kreh, 1969). Once again, these battle
hardened assets were disbanded at hostilities end.
In the late 1800' s, efforts to establish a Federal Naval
Reserve were not particularly successful, but the Navy
Department did succeed somewhat in organizing the various
state naval militias. These state naval militias were heavily
used during the Spanish- American War, but were limited to
service within the U.S. This issue was addressed by the
states; however, when they permitted trained militiamen to
take leaves of absences and volunteer for the Regular Navy.
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This eventually resulted in the passing of legislation to
create an Auxiliary Naval Force specifically recruited from
the state naval militias. Repeating a now familiar pattern,
the ships and crews of the Auxiliary Naval Force were released
at war's end.
Although there was a general consensus concerning the
rationale for an established national Naval Reserve
unconnected with the various state naval militias, nothing
significant happened until the passing of the Naval Militia
Act of 1914. This Act consolidated the state naval militias
under the Navy Department and gave the President authority to
mobilize these assets in a national emergency. Subsequent
legislation in 1915, urged by Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels and Assistant Secretary Franklin Roosevelt,
established the authority for a Federal Naval Reserve
consisting of sailors honorably discharged from the Regular
Navy (Kreh, 1969) . Unfortunately, no provisions were made for
paying or training these new reservists. The Naval Reserve
Force Act of 1916 rectified this shortcoming. With World War
I just around the corner, the formal organization of a Naval
Reserve Force was a timely accomplishment. Naval Reservists'
participation in the war was substantial, eventually
comprising over 60% of the Navy's total personnel assets
(Shriver, 1978) . As had happened during previous periods of
relative calm, reserve forces were allowed to atrophy and
disintegrate after the war ended.
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The United States found itself facing World War II with a
desperate need to man its Navy, although the situation would
have been much worse had lawmakers not taken steps in 1925 to
reorganize the program.
That there was a Naval Reserve to call upon was due only
to the foresightedness of a few men who, between wars,
remembered the lessons learned in 1917. Public apathy
after the first war defeated the Navy's attempts to
reorganize the released Reservists into drilling units
with a definite program. Congress was cool to the idea of
spending money for such things because, after all, we had
just won the "war to end all wars." With poor facilities
and less and less money, the Navy's attempt to keep a
Naval Reserve faltered, and in 1921, it was forced to
disenroll practically the entire Naval Reserve Force
(Kreh, 1969) .
The Naval Reserve went from being a force of 22,000
personnel in 1938 to one of over 3 million at the end of World
War II, comprising over 80% of total Navy personnel strength
in 1945 (Kreh, 1969) . In a departure from the long
established pattern of neglect during peacetime, reserve
forces did not immediately fall into disrepair after the war.
Various initiatives, including extensive recruiting, were
taken to keep the reserve forces intact. President Truman
sanctioned this effort by signing a bill in 1948 that provided
retirement benefits for reservists. He went on to say:
If the standing forces of the Regular establishments are
to be kept small, as is the tradition of the United
States, the civilian Reserve must always be ready as part
of the trained nucleus around which a citizen Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Air Force can be built if
need ever arises. The Reserve and Regular forces must
therefore work together in effective teamwork, with the
Regular Services providing the equipment, the training
facilities, and the expert guidance needed by the Reserve
forces, and the Reserve personnel devoting their best
18
efforts to keeping our national defense establishment in
a constant state of readiness" (Kreh, 1969).
Korea saw the call-up of over 250,000 Naval Reservists,
many with substantial World War II combat experience. The
experiences of this recall led to the Armed Forces Reserve Act
of 1952, as amended by the Reserve Forces Act of 1955.
Despite this legislative boost, the reserves once again fell
into disrepair. The personnel were there, but training
programs and support were lacking. The Navy, recognizing the
problem, initiated needed changes and established a nationwide
command, the Naval Reserve Training Command, to administer the
program. "This led to the Selected Reserve concept, which
provides trained units and individuals for immediate active
duty when needed" (Kreh, 1969)
.
Although manning levels, training support, funding, and
hardware investment have all peaked and fallen several times
in the years since the 1950' s, the reserve forces have
remained a fixture of our defense mechanism and have
successfully mobilized as a command or augmented active forces
in a variety of international and domestic contingencies.
These include: The Berlin Airlift, the Cuban Missile Crisis,
the Vietnam Conflict, hundreds of civil disturbances,
Operation Earnest Will, Operation Just Cause, and, most
recently, Operation Desert Shield/Storm (Total Force Policy
Report, 1990) . Today, under the Total Force concept, active
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and reserve forces are viewed as a single entity, with
comparable equipment, training, and other resource support.
Under the hammer of an uncertain and rapidly shrinking
defense budget, the fiscally and politically attractive
reserve forces provide a potentially significant asset in
maintaining America's defensive posture in the coming years.
In fact, with the current constraints on the defense budget,
the United States probably couldn't mount and sustain a
significant military engagement without the involvement of
reserve forces (Philbin and Gould, 1985) . Although a general
cost comparison would be misleading when comparing specific
units, an aggregate cost savings of over 50% can be found when
comparing active and reserve elements (Shriver, 19 78) . While
primarily administrative- type units cost little more than the
military pay of the reserve members, hardware intensive units
represent the least in costs savings. For example, Naval
Reserve forces ships are only 10% less expensive to operate
than "fully-active, immediately deployable, fully-maintained
front-line ships" (Report to the Congress, 1991)
.
Reserve elements have traditionally been thought of as
" forces -in- reserve, " a trained cadre of ready assets to
augment active forces in times of hostility. Under the Total
Force Policy, created by Secretary of Defense Laird, reserve
forces are considered full partners with the active components
(Moore, 1991) . As Secretary Weinberger stated:
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We can no longer consider reserve forces as merely forces
in reserve. Instead, they have to be an integral part of
the total force, both within the U.S. and within NATO.
They have to be, and in fact are, a blending of the
professionalism of the full-time soldier with the
professionalism of the citizen-soldier. Only in that way
can we achieve the military strength that is necessary to
defend our freedom (Philbin and Gould, 1985)
.
As "forces- in-being, " reserves are not necessarily a
mirror- image of their active counterparts, standing by to fill
the additional manning allowances authorized to meet wartime
requirements (Moore, 1991) . Various units are now considered
stand-alone commands as opposed to augmenting units,
concentrating on mission capabilities that are not fully
needed and/or economical to maintain in times of peace.
Examples of these types of units include: cargo handling
forces, fleet hospitals, coastal surveillance, fleet air
logistics, and forward base component units (Moore, 1991).
The primary focus of various elements of the reserve
forces is continuing to change as the overall military
structure evolves. It is no longer simply a matter of a unit
training for the possibility of recall or mobilization, but a
question of what they can do now to support their active duty
counterparts. This effort is referred to as contributory
support, that is, contributing to the accomplishment of the
gaining command's primary mission or by providing other
essential support to the active forces in general.
Although literature makes little reference of Naval
Reserve participation in the acquisition process, one can
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logically assume that they have contributed in one way or
another for as long as reserve forces have been in existence.
Today, reservists are serving in a host of acquisition related
billets at a variety of gaining commands such as: Naval
Regional Contracting Centers, Naval Supply Centers, Systems
Commands, and other staff augmenting units. The Supply
Reserve Vision Study2 sees the future of the Supply Reserve as
supporting seven key functional "pillars." These are:
• Fleet Support





• Information Systems Support
While acquisition is not considered a key functional pillar,
it was specifically mentioned as being a critical component in
four of these pillars.
The focus of this study is the Naval Reserve units
directly affiliated with, and supporting the mission of, the
Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) and the Defense
Contract Management District (DCMD) offices. These units are
manned by approximately 125 reserve Navy Supply Corps officers
2The Supply Reserve Vision Study was chartered to examine the
present Supply Reserve and how it will support the active forces in
the future. The Summary Report was release in November 1991.
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ranging in rank from Lieutenant through Captain. They perform
monthly drills and two weeks active duty for training per
year, much the same as other reserve organizations. The
primary difference between the DCMD units and most other
reserve units is the fact that they generally perform their
duties at the DCMD offices rather than a reserve center. The
purpose is twofold: 1) hands-on training and, 2) contributory
support
.
Naval Reserve personnel involved in the acquisition
process bring with them the full spectrum of education and
experience. Some are GM-15 1102s (Contracting), fully
qualified to assume whatever Acquisition Workforce duties may
be assigned, while others have little or no practical
experience or educational background in the field. Others
have substantial civilian acquisition related experience that,
while certainly an asset, may not be readily applicable to
their duties at the DCMD units. Most have extensive civilian
business experience that can be of value somewhere in the
acquisition process. Regardless of their education or
experience level coming into the billet, all officers must
qualify by fulfilling the requirements of an Individual
Training Plan (ITP) 3 tailored specifically to their
mobilization billet. Completion of the ITP qualifies the
individual to perform the duties required in their assigned




mobilization billet. One important aspect to note is that the
reservist's contributory support functions may or may not be
related to the duties and responsibilities the reservist would
normally be expected to fulfill in his/her mobilization
billet. Generally, the emphasis is on billet qualification
until the officer becomes fully qualified, at which point
he/she can then place greater focus on contributory support.
Depending upon the experience and training the individual
reservist brings into the unit, full qualification can take
from one to two years.





• Procurement Management Staff Officer
• Quality Assurance Officer
• Contract Administrator
The grades required to fill these billets are commensurate
with those required to fill comparable active duty/civilian
Acquisition Corps and Critical Acquisition Position jobs.
With the passing of DAWIA, and its applicability to reservists
undecided, some questions can be raised. If the active
duty/civilian equivalent positions must be filled with
personnel certified under DAWIA, can the reserve units
continue to use their current billet structure and train to
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standards they may never be able to satisfy? If the reserve
units must change their billet structure to avoid this
conflict, how will the new structure look? The intent of this
thesis is to provide information that will help in answering
these questions.
B. LITERATURE REVIEW
There are vast amounts of literature available concerning
reserve forces in general, and, in particular, their
historical foundations and contributions to the defense of
this nation. Most sources adequately describe the roles of
the major combat arms elements, but provide little detail on
the lesser known elements of the supporting arms. Therefore,
there is little in print that covers the contributions of
reserves involved in the acquisition process or the background
and policies that guide their utilization. With that said,
the following subsections will examine some of the literature
available on related issues, policies, and background.
1 . DAWIA
a. Legislative Background
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
(DAWIA) was included in the Defense Authorization Act of 1991,
Public Law 101-510, as Title XII. The Act consists of two
subchapters. The first addresses general responsibilities and
calls for the Secretary of Defense to establish, and uniformly
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implement, policies and procedures for the effective
management of personnel serving in DoD acquisition positions.
A primary emphasis in the DAWIA is on increased education,
training, and qualification requirements. The Secretary
of Defense is to establish education, training, and
experience requirements based on the level of complexity
of the duties carried out in the position. After October
1, 1993, there are positive requirements for contracting
officers above the small purchase threshold (Edgar, 1991)
.
The education, training, and experience requirements vary
depending upon the level and particular acquisition career
field. The requirements are cumulative and generally must be
fulfilled in each level before progressing to the next higher
level. There are three levels in which acquisition personnel
can qualify (DODM 5000. 52M, 1991):
• Basic Level (Level I) - Basic level training standards,
designed to establish fundamental qualifications in the
individual's career field and prepare personnel for
positions of increasing responsibility. Full
qualification must be attained within 18 months of
assignment. Generally applicable to GS-05 through 08, and
officer ranks of 0-1 through 0-3.
• Intermediate Level (Level II) - Development progresses,
specialization is emphasized, but general expertise in the
career field is important. Individuals should meet Level
II qualification standards prior to assignment. If not,
they must be completed within 18 months. Generally
applicable to GS-09 through 12, and officer ranks of 0-
3/0-4.
• Senior Level (Level III) - All requirements for Levels I
and II should be completed. The individual should have
significant knowledge and experience in his/her career
field and a general understanding of the entire
acquisition process. Individuals should meet Level III
qualification requirements prior to assignment. If not,
they must be completed within 18 months. Generally




Detailed training, education, and experience requirements for
each level can be found in Appendix A.
The second subchapter concerns acquisition positions. It
calls for the Secretary of Defense to designate, by
regulation, defense acquisition positions to "include all
acquisition-related positions in 11 different categories,
including contracting ..." (Edgar, 1991). The Secretary is
also required to establish specific career paths in each
field, and must limit the reservation of assignments for
military officers to those positions where it is essential for
the performance of duties, required by law, or otherwise
justified (Edgar, 1991)
.
The forces that led to the passing of DAWIA evolved over
a number of years. Early attempts by Congress and the
Department of Defense to address perceived and real problems
in the acquisition process were aimed more at the process
itself. The publishing of the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) , Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS) , and a stream of agency and component directives and
instructions were the result. The newsmaking problems
encountered in the 1980 's shifted attention to the management
structure and personnel employed in the acquisition system.
The Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985, reports from
the Packard Commission, Military Service and academic studies,
and the Defense Acquisition Improvement Act of 1986 addressed
the issues of education, training, career path, opportunities,
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and experience. DAWIA essentially grew out of these efforts
and is intended to "create a body of well-educated, trained,
and dedicated acquisition professionals" (SECNAVINST 5300.34,
1991)
.
b. Applicability to Reservists
The applicability of DAWIA to the reserves has
been, and is currently being, examined and debated. The
original draft version of DAWIA specifically addressed
reserves; however, this coverage was later dropped. 4 The
exact intent of Congress is not known, but the implication is
that they did not intend for it to apply to reservists.
Nothing could be found in writing that supports or contradicts
this implication. Additionally, DoD and Navy guidance
implementing DAWIA does not specifically address the reserve
applicability of DAWIA. Therefore, it is left up to DLA and
the individual Services to decide for themselves how DAWIA
will be applied, if at all, to their reserve personnel and
billets
.
Many individuals queried felt that it would be impractical
to apply DAWIA to the reserves. Based on their limited active
duty experience and training, and the difficulty of completing
the necessary training requirements in the capacity of a
drilling reservist, very few officers would be able to attain
4Several unrelated and anonymous sources provided this
information.
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the level of training and experience necessary to qualify for
Acquisition Corps billets commensurate with their grade.
The consensus of everyone that I talked with on this
subject was that it is impractical to apply DAWIA to the
reserves, and if it were applied, few, if any, reserves
would ever be able to meet the training and experience
requirements to be certified for Acquisition Corps
billets. In the past, any requirements applicable to
active duty billets were also applied to comparable
reserve billets at DLA .... While this precedent suggests
DAWIA should be applied to the reserves, DoD has many
rules and regulations that are waived during mobilization,
and it is logical that Acquisition Corps certifications
required by DAWIA would be waived in wartime (Atchley,
1992) .
There is a fear that "opponents of the Reserve community would
seize upon a double standard of qualification for Reserves to
reduce program funding and manpower" (Morgan, 1992) . However,
adequately addressing the question of effective utilization of
reserve assets should be sufficient in countering any
opposition. Regardless of specific utilization conclusions,
the training requirements of DAWIA will logically be the
guiding force in determining the mobilization billet training
standards for DLA acquisition reservists, whether or not DAWIA
is found applicable. At the present time, DAWIA is the
standard. Some proponents recommend that a preference be
shown for officers at, or close to, certification at a certain
level when making billet assignments. One Service has
determined that, because of the demands of Level III
certification, their benchmark for all ranks would be
qualification at Level II. In reality, these requirements are
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not markedly different than pre-DAWIA requirements for most
reserve procurement billets.
2. DLA, DCMC, and Contributory Support
The Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS)
,
DCMC's predecessor, was born in January 1966 as a branch of
the Defense Supply Agency (now DLA) . The concept for
administering all Defense contracts under a single command
evolved during the McNamara years. Overlapping coverage,
duplication of effort, differing systems and approaches, and
a general lack of coordination among various agencies and
departments were prevalent in an era where all Military
Services and agencies administered their own contracts.
Project 60 was chartered in 1962 to look at the contract
administration function and to:
Prepare a plan for establishing uniform field contract
management covering all the contract management functions
and further provide alternate plans for establishing this
uniform structure outside of the perimeters of the
Military Departments (Mastin, 1973).
Based on the results of the Project 60 study, McNamara
established a project of limited scope to test the concept of
consolidated contract administration services (Mastin, 1973) .
Following successful completion of the limited and follow-on
national tests, DCAS was formally established. Its strength
then, as it remains now, is the "single face to industry, " a
viable means of eliminating confusion while achieving
economies of scale and efficiencies.
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Project 60 was not to be the end of investigations into,
and audits of, the contract administration function. In 1975,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Logistics) chartered a comprehensive review known as "Forward
Look" (Forward Look, 1976) . This study generated many policy
and manpower actions, particularly in the engineering area, in
its effort to prepare the contract administration function for
the future.
One of the key objectives for the future of DLA reserve
participation concerns value-adding contributory support (RFAC
Minutes, 1993) . Reserve units must still plan and train for
possible mobilization, but in doing so they must also be a
cost effective asset. As MGEN Aler, USAFR, stated, "...we
serve as an insurance policy in case of war and we must insure
the premium cost is paid during peacetime as value added..."
(RFAC Minutes, 1993) . The Reserve Mission Statement for DLA
affiliated units sums this up (RFAC Minutes, 1993):
The DLA Reserve Mission is to provide the right people,
trained, ready and available with a unique blend of
military and civilian talent and experience to meet
contingency requirements and provide support to DLA day to
day operations.
DLA is currently examining many areas in an effort to
solve problems and/or prepare for the future. Two areas
mentioned specifically address Naval Reserve participation.
The first, Business Development, hopes to use a " . . .DLA/Naval
Reserve team to accumulate and analyze market information for
a Business Development Plan" (RFAC Minutes, 1993) . The second
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area, Special Remedies, involves contract fraud investigations
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) . Naval Reservists have in
the past provided specialized business and contractual
expertise to augment DOJ's scarce manpower resources and speed
indictment/conviction efforts (RFAC Minutes, 1993) . Although
on the surface this may seem like a peacetime activity, the
"risk of contractor error/fraud can be expected to be higher
in the increased level of activity that accompanies wartime
tempo" (Supply Reserve Vision Study, 1991) . These distinct
initiatives clearly indicate that there is a place for Naval
Reservists in the acquisition process and are consistent with
observed historical benefits of reserve force involvement.
Specifically, reserves can provide an important channel for
networking and serving as translators and constructive brokers
between civilian and military institutions (Zuricher, 1986).
Active duty and civilian Government employees involved in the
acquisition process frequently lack industrial experience.
They may be fluent in military jargon and bureaucratese, but
lack savvy in, and a deep understanding of, the corporate
world. The reservist is often fluent in not only the language
of the military and bureaucrat, but intimately knows the
language of the business community (Morgan interview, 1993).
It makes sense to use the reservist as an interface, a
translator, or even a troubleshooter . In a loosely related
development, there has been some involvement of reservists in
a consulting group capacity (Morgan interview, 1993). This
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concept appears to remove some of the emphasis on qualifying
for a mobilization billet, and concentrates more on utilizing
the skills the reservist has already developed through years
of active duty, reserve, and civilian involvement.
There is precedence for emphasizing greater use of a
reservist's civilian expertise. The Air Force Reserve
Associate Program provides one such example (Philbin and
Gould, 1985). As Philbin and Gould further elaborate:
In the total -force environment, and at a time when the DoD
is placing more stress on cost - savings , it may be
preferable to organize qualified Reservists, for whom
staff or unit billets are not readily available, into
specialized task forces that work on priority projects
requiring their unique expertise (Philbin and Gould,
1985)
.
Failing to acknowledge and use the vast amounts of business
expertise offered by reservists, gained free of charge through
civilian endeavors, constitutes a lost opportunity at
achieving greater economies and efficiencies. This fact was
not lost on the participants of the Supply Reserve Vision
Study. Sitting atop the "seven pillars" are six strategies
for the future, including:
• Maximize Contributory Support
• Leverage Civilian Skills
By leveraging civilian skills, the Navy can increase its
return on investment, just as a successful business enterprise
increases return through effective use of financial leverage.
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C . METHODOLOGY
The methodology for conducting this study relied on
questionnaires (Appendix A) completed by Naval Reserve Supply
Corps officers actively working in DCMC affiliated units. The
questionnaires were designed in three parts to solicit hard
information along with the experiences and opinions of the
respondents. Part 1 asks the respondents to list their
current civilian occupation, reserve billet, and years of
service. The purpose of this part is to categorize the
respondent by billet, occupation, and length of service. Part
2 is the core of the questionnaire. It asks for a
comprehensive list of military and civilian acquisition-
related positions held including duties and responsibilities,
earned Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) codes,
opinions on duties performed, and opinions on duties the
respondent would like, and feels qualified, to perform. The
purpose of this part is to categorize the respondent by
experience, duties performed, and opinions concerning
utilization potential. Part 3 is a skills profile based on
the requirements listed in DAWIA. The respondent is asked to
check-off attainment of the specific training, education, and
experience requirements for Levels I through III. The purpose
of this part is to ascertain where reserve officers stand in
meeting the requirements for certification under DAWIA.
The data generated through this questionnaire will be
categorized and consolidated to determine commonalities,
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differences, and patterns pointing to a general consensus of
opinion and conclusions on the most effective utilization of
reservists. This consensus will then be compared to the
literature review information previously presented to
determine the practicality of the respondents utilization
concepts. Literature and interviews used in conducting this
study are listed in the bibliography.
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III. PRESENTATION OF DATA COLLECTED
The raw data for this thesis were generated through the
use of two questionnaires. The first questionnaire (Appendix
A) was forwarded to the approximately 125 reserve officers
currently serving in DCMD affiliated billets. Each officer
was provided with a companion questionnaire (Appendix B) to
forward to the active duty or civilian DCMD employee with whom
he/she interacts the most. Appendices A and B are alike in
design for the purpose of collecting similar data from the two
distinct groups. Of 250 questionnaires mailed, 61 were
returned completed: 47 from SELRES officers and 14 from DCMD
employees, for a response rate of 37.6 percent and 11.2
percent, respectively. The remainder of this chapter will
present the data generated by the questionnaires. The data
will be presented in the same format as the surveys were
constructed; that is, each question and its responses will be
addressed individually in order. Responses will be presented
as a percentage of total responses received. In employing
open-ended questions, such as the ones used in this survey, it
is entirely possible to obtain as many different answers as
there are respondents. This undisciplined element was
intentional to allow respondents to answer freely, without the
encumbrance of trying to fit responses into arbitrary
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categories established by the researcher. However, to
simplify presentation and analysis, responses will be
categorized and grouped according to similarities that became
evident during the collation effort. To ensure that the value
of significant individual responses is not lost, specific
comments will be presented to clarify or support a particular
point or as otherwise deemed appropriate.
Before presenting the data generated by the
questionnaires, a brief overview of the units involved in this
research is appropriate. Currently, there are 122 Navy Supply
Corps officer billets aligned with the DCMD units. This
represents about 12 percent of all officers in Supply Corps
Reserve programs. Many of the units carry additional officers
above their authorized billet allowance. These may be
transients awaiting a permanent reserve billet, officers
technically attached to another unit but drilling with the
DCMD unit, or junior officers enrolled in the Basic
Qualification Course at the Naval Supply Corps School.
Officers from the latter category are generally assigned to
units such as the DCMD affiliates because of the significant
Supply Corps experience embodied in the unit structure. The
units themselves are geographically spread throughout the
United States and are organizationally aligned with the DCMC
Headquarters and the five district DCMD offices. Table 3-1
presents the units, their locations, and authorized billets.
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TABLE 3-1 RESERVE DCMD UNITS
UNITS LOCATION BILLETS
NR DCMD BOSTON A 101 QUINCY, MA 11
NR DCMD BOSTON B 202 BRONX, NY 10
NR DCMD PHILADELPHIA A 304 PHILADELPHIA, PA 10
NR DCMD PHILADELPHIA B 405 CLEVELAND, OH 13
NR DCMC WASHINGTON 106 WASHINGTON, DC 16
NR DCMD ATLANTA A 708 ATLANTA, GA 11
NR DCMD ATLANTA B 81
1
DALLAS, TX 10
NR DCMD CHICAGO A 513 FOREST PARK, IL 15
NR DCMD CHICAGO B 618 ST. LOUIS, MO 8
NR DCMD LOS ANGELES, A 919 LOS ANGELES, CA 11
NR DCMD LOS ANGELES B 1020 SAN BRUNO, CA 7
Source: Supply Corps Reserve Program Directory, 1993
A. SELRES QUESTIONNAIRES
Part 1 of the questionnaire written for SELRES officers
asked for general information such as: Reserve Unit,
Mobilization Billet, Time in Unit, and Current Civilian
Occupation. The specific reserve unit and mobilization billet
were solicited from each respondent to facilitate any
subsequent determination of trends or patterns in responses,
and will be used during analysis of generated data in Chapter
IV. Table 3-2 provides a summary of the respondents' time in
unit, years of active duty, and years of drilling reserve
participation
.
The figures generated for "Time in Unit" are consistent
with the Naval Reserve's policy of regularly rotating SELRES
officers among different and varied pay billets. Respondents
indicated that the norm for the Air Force and Army IMAs they
work with tends to be five to six years of association with
any one particular command. The mean and median for length
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TABLE 3-2: TIME IN SERVICE
O-4/BELOW 0-5/0-6
MEAN MEDIAN RANGE MEAN MEDIAN RANGE
TIME IN 1.2 1.0 .5 -3.0 1.8 1.0 .5 -4.5
UNIT (YRS)
ACTIVE 5.1 5.5 0- 11.5 5.7 5.0 2.5 - 11.0
DUTY (YRS)
RESERVE 5.9 7.0 .5 - 22.0 14.5 14.5 6.0- 21.0
DUTY (YRS)
Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 1
of active duty in both categories of officers results from a
predominant cluster of service lengths around the five year
point. This length of active duty is consistent with an
initial sea tour and a follow- on shore tour prior to release
from active duty. Very few officers continued on to further
active duty assignments.
Another significant area surveyed in Part 1 of the
questionnaire concerned the reserve officer's current civilian
occupation. While no two respondents were identically
employed, their occupations could be generally categorized
into five areas: Acquisition, Management, Banking/ Finance,
Planning/Analysis, and Other Occupations. These categories
were selected by the researcher based on the predominant
responsibility the respondents cited in his/her job
description, if offered, or those that could be inferred from
the occupational title itself. The following list provides a
brief explanation of the various occupation categories:
• Acquisition - Public and private sector occupations
involved directly in the procurement of systems or
material, or those strongly related to, supporting, or
managing the procurement of systems or material.
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• Management - Public or private sector occupations
primarily involved in managing, and having personal
responsibility for, personnel and/or material assets.
• Banking/Finance - Private sector occupations involved in
banking, financial markets, or the management of monetary
assets
.
• Planning /Analysis - Public and private sector occupations
primarily involved in planning/analytical endeavors
without the encumbrance of management responsibilities.
• Other Occupations - All occupations that don't fit one of
the above categories. Consists mainly of officers who are
self-employed.
Table 3-3 outlines these categories, the percentage of
respondents in each, and some of the specific jobs
highlighting each category.
A more detailed classification of occupations can be made
if consideration is given to the environment in which the
respondents are employed. For example, almost half of the
SELRES officers grouped under the Acquisition category are
Government employees. Others are employed in project
management or contracting departments of defense contractors;
therefore, they are very well versed in the intricacies of
Government acquisition. The rest occupy positions that lend
themselves to gaining familiarity with a variety of business
enterprises and systems.
Some members (approximately 3 0%) of the Management
category listed purchasing, contracting, or acquisition as one
of their more important duties, although not a primary one.
Those that didn't cite acquisition as part of their duties
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TABLE 3-3 CIVILIAN OCCUPATIONS
CATEGORY PERCENTAGE EMPLOYED REPRESENTATIVE POSITIONS

























Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 1
nonetheless claimed that their business experience is
applicable to some of the duties and responsibilities they're
assigned at the reserve unit. Similarly, members involved in
Banking/Finance and Planning/Analysis offered their
experiences with a variety of businesses, accounting systems,
processes, and ADP as applicable to some role in the
Government acquisition process. Lastly, 50 percent of the
attorneys listed contract law/litigation as one of their areas
of expertise and employment.
Part 2 of the questionnaire solicited responses concerning
the SELRES officer's duties, qualifications, likes, dislikes,
and other thoughts he/she may have concerning future
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utilization. As with the responses in Part 1, the data will
be categorized as appropriate for each question. The survey
questions will be addressed individually.
Question 1. Please list all contracting related positions
you have held in your capacity as a civilian, active duty
officer, and reserve officer; and summarize your duties,
responsibilities, and length of time you held each position.
Please list any professional affiliations and certifications
that apply, i.e. NCMA/CPCM .
The purpose of this question was to develop an experience
profile consisting of all practical acquisition experience the
reservists may have had throughout their military and civilian
careers. Almost all respondents (87 percent) claimed small
purchasing experience gained during their initial sea tours.
Approximately one third had active duty acquisition experience
over and above small purchase. About one half (17 percent of
total respondents) of these received their experience at
elements of the Defense Contract Administration Services
(DCAS) . Another third claimed prior reserve experience in an
acquisition billet at a DCAS affiliated unit, a Naval Regional
Contracting Center (NRCC) unit, or at a shipyard/staff unit
requiring acquisition training and Navy Officer Billet
Classification (NOBC) codes. Lastly, almost half claimed some
form of acquisition experience in their civilian employment
history. Table 3-4 outlines the questionnaire responses by
category (active, reserve, and civilian) , lists the percentage
of positive responses, and cites representative positions.
The reader is referred back to Table 3-3 for representative
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TABLE 3-4: PRIOR ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE
EXPERIENCE CATEGORY PERCENTAGE RESPONDING REPRESENTATIVE POSITIONS









RESERVE MILITARY 38% AUDIT OFFICER
ASSISTANT PROCUREMENT OFFICER
VARIOUS PAY BILLETS AT DCMD (FORMERLY DCAS
UNITS), NRCC, AND SHIPYARD UNITS
CIVILIAN 41% REFER TO TABLE 3-3
Source: Thesis Questionnaire (App endix A), Part 2, Question 1
positions under the Civilian experience category. Table 3-3
lists only 21 percent in the Acquisition category, while Table
3-4 lists 41 percent with civilian acquisition experience.
The difference is due to the classification of the Civilian
Occupations. The Acquisition category in Table 3-3 lists only
those respondents who cited primarily acquisition related
positions as their current profession. Table 3-4 includes
attorneys and other individuals who cited acquisition
functions as part of their employment even though it may not
be their primary responsibility, and includes individuals who
had previously worked in acquisition related areas.
Question 1 also queried respondents for years of
experience in each category. Table 3-5 summarizes this
information. The longevity cited for active duty acquisition
experience (2.8 years) corresponds to approximately one tour
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of duty and includes only those respondents who replied
positively. The longevity cited for reserve experience
TABLE 3-5: YEARS OF ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE
CATEGORY MEAN RANGE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 2.8 2.0-5.0
RESERVE MILITARY 4.6 1.0- 12.0
CIVILIAN 8.5 1.0- 16.0
Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 2, OueslJ " 1
corresponds to approximately one and one half reserve tours at
a DCMD, NRCC, or other applicable unit.
Questions 2 and 3 are interrelated and will be addressed
together. Prior to addressing these questions, it is
appropriate to briefly describe what a NOBC code is and what
the codes addressed in this study represent. NOBCs are used
to identify skills required for a particular position, and
conversely, also identify an individual reservist's
qualifications achieved through experience (military and
civilian) , education, or both. A match between a required
NOBC and an earned NOBC indicates that the individual is
qualified for that position. Although DCMD billets may
require a variety of NOBCs depending upon the focus of the
particular position, this study is concentrating on the three
listed below as they are applicable to other
contracting/acquisition type billets that could be filled by
anyone interested in pursuing a formal acquisition career
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path. A brief definition of these codes is presented below
(Ross, 1993) :
• 1476 -Procurement Management Officer - Manages procurement
functions, establishes policies and procedures governing
procurement and production of materials, products, and
services. Determines procurement objectives, monitors
contract administration, quality assurance, and production
surveillance. Evaluates contractor performance,
contractor business/financial operations, practices, and
decisions. Directs all phases of the contracting process.
• 1480- Procurement Contracting Officer - Contracts for
systems, equipment, supplies, and services. Reviews
requests, solicits bids/proposals, evaluates sources,
negotiates, and awards contracts.
• 1485 -Administrative Contracting Officer - Administers all
types of contracts. Approves wage schedules, progress
payments, and accounting, estimating, and purchasing
systems. Determines allowability and allocability of
costs, manages inspection programs, monitors delivery, and
analyzes claims. Negotiates and executes contract
modifications, negotiates overhead rates, supervises
property administration and security requirements.
Question 2. Have you earned one of the following Navy
Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) codes ?
NOBC Yes No
1476 - Procurement Management Officer
1480 - Procurement Contracting Officer
1485 - Administrative Contracting Officer
Question 3. If you answered yes to any of the NOBCs
listed above, please describe the basis upon which it was
granted .
These NOBCs are the primary ones required of SELRES
officers in most acquisition billets. The successful
attainment of one or more of these is necessary before the
reservist can be considered mobilization billet qualified. To
qualify for a particular NOBC, the reservist must complete a
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specific list of course work and/or meet certain experience
milestones depending upon whether the NOBC was earned on
active or reserve duty. Table 3-6 summarizes the "yes"
responses to Question 2, and the basis for obtainment
responses to Question 3.
TABLE 3-6: NAVY OFFICER BILLET CLASSIFICATION (NOBC) CODES
CATEGORY 1476 1480 1485 HOW OBTAINED
CM AND BELOW 0% 10% 25% INTERNSHIP PROGRAM
CORRESPONDENCE COURSE
ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING (AT)
ACTIVE DUTY EXPERIENCE
0-5/0-6 7% 22% 59% CORRESPONDENCE COURSES
ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING
ACTIVE DUTY EXPERIENCE AND SCHOOLING
Source: Thesis Queslionnair : (Appendix A) , Part 2, Questicns 2 and 3
Due to the nature of the mission of the DCMD units, NOBC 1485
is by far the most frequently earned code among these three.
Information regarding the other two codes is pertinent when
determining the reservist's qualifications for follow-on
acquisition billets with other commands as part of a formal
acquisition career path.
While virtually all of the senior officers possessed the
requisite NOBC for their particular billet, most would find
themselves requiring a year or more to earn one of the other
NOBCs in qualifying for other acquisition related
billets/units. The majority of the junior officers surveyed
were in the process of earning their required NOBC; however,
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they would be in the same situation were they to move to
another unit or functional billet.
Question 4. Please list the tasks and duties you are
currently performing during your IDT/IDTT/AT that you feel
contribute most to the mission of the DCMD .
This question was intended to be an open-ended query to
determine what the individual respondents felt were their
strongest contributions to the mission effectiveness of their
gaining commands. The responses were broken into five
categories based on the general nature of the tasks assigned.
Over one fourth of the respondents listed some form of audit
or review as a task they viewed as contributing to the mission
of their gaining command. Taskings that fell into this
category included anything that required the reservist to
review a system or process for compliance, accuracy, or
effectiveness. Over one third of the respondents cited
Analysis/Research/Planning as providing a significant
contribution. Taskings that fell into this category included
those which required the reservist to generate information and
make a decision or recommendation based on that data.
Surprisingly, only about one fifth of the respondents
listed contract administration functions as a significant
contributor to mission effectiveness. Most indicated that
they would like to do more in this area, but time and
accessibility to personnel and fil prevented more
involvement. Almost one fourth of the respondents listed the
provision of training to contractors as a major contribution.
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Finally, several respondents mentioned the concept of
providing consulting services as an area they felt provided a
significant contribution. Table 3-7 summarizes the general
tasks or duties that respondents felt contributed positively,
the percentage of respondents participating, and
representative taskings within these general areas.
TABLE 3-7 MISSION CONTRIBUTIONS
GENERAL CATEGORY PERCENTAGE RESPONDING REPRESENTATIVE TASKINGS

















CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION 17% CONTRACT CLOSEOUT
PRICE/COST ANALYSIS




TRAINING 21% CONTRACTOR TRAINING AND ORIENTATION
SMALL BUSINESS PRESENTATIONS




Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Pa rt 2, Question 4
Question 5. Please list any tasks and duties you are
currently performing during your IDT/IDTT/AT that vou feel do
not contribute to the overall mission effectiveness of the
DCMD (i.e. any make-work assignments?) .
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Respondents were more adamant concerning their responses
to Question 5 than they were to Question 4. There was general
agreement (62 percent) that administrative requirements (Naval
Reserve administrative matters vice DLA/DCMC administrative
matters) consumed a significant amount of time. These
requirements included General Military Training, parent
reserve center taskings, and a wide assortment of Navy
reports, papers, records, and forms. A significant portion of
most drill weekends are spent on these matters, effectively
reducing the amount of time available to other matters such as
training and contributory support. Other respondents
indicated that isolated, unrelated, and trivial projects, such
as routine clerical work, were time wasters when compared to
comprehensive unit projects of obvious importance to the
gaining command. The respondents felt that these projects
tended to be make- work assignments, contributing little to the
mission accomplishment of the office. Conversely,
comprehensive unit projects tended to lead to larger, more
complex assignments that were more easily viewed as
contributing significantly to the DCMD office. Table 3-8
summarizes these results.
Question 6. Please list any tasks and duties you are not
currently asked to perform that you feel you have the
requisite experience and skills to perform, and that would
enhance your contribution to the mission of the unit .
The respondents were previously asked what they do that
they feel contributes and what they do that they feel doesn't
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62% GENERAL MILITARY TRAINING
DC/3-M TRAINING
NAVAL RESERVE MANDATED REPORTS
NON-DLA ADMINISTRATIVE PAPERWORK
TRIPS TO THE RESERVE CENTER
UNDER UTILIZATION 24% MAKE-WORK ASSIGNMENTS
TRIVIAL PROJECTS
ALL ASSIGNMENTS CONTRIBUTE
TO THE MISSION OF DCMD
5%
NO RESPONSE 19%
Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Part 2, Question 5
Note: Responses total to greater than 100 percent due to the acceptance of multiple responses from any one respondent.
contribute to the mission of their gaining command. This
question is really the core of the thesis as it solicits the
ideas of the reservists concerning the possibilities for their
future utilization. Since each reservist is speaking from a
unique prior experience background and viewpoint, as modified
by current insight, this researcher expected, and received, a
wide range of responses to the question. A wide variety of
functional areas were mentioned, with no single area receiving
more than 10 percent of the responses. Interestingly, each
respondent cited only one area, and the task mentioned tended
to be something already being accomplished, not a new tasking.
As such, the responses were very similar to those items listed
as current contributions to the mission of the gaining
commands. Respondents and gaining commands reporting sound
working relationships tended to agree not only on current
utilization, but future utilization as well. This "agreement"
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was the only pattern evident from the responses. The variety
and nature of the responses defies establishing a clear trend
as to the path these units should follow toward achieving
their most effective employment other than to continue what
they are doing at present. Table 3-9 summaries the results of
this question.
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Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appenclix A), Part 2, Question 6
Question 7. Do you feel there are adequate controls in
place to prevent conflicts of interest between your civilian
employment and your duties at DCMD? If inadequate, please
indicate suggested controls for future implementation .
The purpose of this question was to assess the perceived
exposure to a conflict of interest considering the tasks
assigned the reservists. Since their duties generally require
little interaction with contractors or access to material or
51
information that could lead to a conflict of interest, most
reserve officers are not exposed to this risk. However, for
the DCMC reservist this may be a relevant issue, especially
when the member is employed by a defense contractor. Most
respondents (92 percent) indicated that there are adequate
controls in place to prevent conflicts of interest. Controls
mentioned consisted of the completion of a Confidential
Statement of Affiliations and Financial Interests (DD Form
1555) , the standard conflict of interests statement executed
upon commencement of Active Duty for Training, and awareness
training as part of GMT or another forum. Eight percent
indicated that adequate controls were not in place, but
declined to specify why they felt this way or suggest further
controls to improve adequacy. One respondent hinted that
he/she had observed a conflict of interest situation, but
declined to elaborate as to action planned or taken in the
matter.
Question 8. If a structured acquisition career path were
available, would you choose to continue to pursue billets in
the field? Why or why not ?
The respondents were in general agreement (76 percent)
that they would pursue acquisition billets if there were a
structured career path. Ten percent indicated that they
thought a structured career path was a sound idea, but that
they were not interested in participating. The remainder were
not interested and didn't feel that a structured path was a
viable idea.
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Reasons for desiring a structured path differed between
respondents. Some indicated that they simply enjoyed the
business-like environment and challenges of the acquisition
field and would be content to pursue a career path exclusively
in acquisition. Other respondents indicated that they would
like to stay in acquisition exclusively because it parallels
their civilian careers, allowing them to make maximum use of
all experiences gained. Most were concerned that while a
structured path would be desirable, the Naval Reserve has
traditionally emphasized regular rotation among the various
billets available, and that obtaining a wide breadth of
experience is essential for promotion. Aside from the
promotion issue, respondents conceded that there are certainly
benefits to becoming a generalist, but maintained that
becoming an expert in the acquisition business is difficult to
do in a few short years. Respondents indicated that any move
to structure an acquisition career path would require some
assurance that promotion opportunities would be equivalent to
those for the generalists.
Respondents were also concerned that a shorter tenure in
DCMD billets placed them at a disadvantage professionally when
compared to other Services. The Naval Reserve keeps personnel
in DCMD billets for about three years, taking at least one to
two years to meet the mobilization billet requirements unless
the individual has significant prior experience and




generally keep their personnel in a stable billet for
five or more years. Many respondents indicated that this
length of tenure seemed to be more agreeable to their gaining
commands. Table 3-10 summarizes the results of Question 8.
TABLE 3-10 STRUCTURED CAREER PATH
STRUCTURED CAREER PATH? PERCENTAGE
RESPONDING
WHY?
YES 77% INTEREST IN FIELD
PARALLEL CIVILIAN CAREER
MORE EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION
MATCH OTHER SERVICES TENURE
BETTER CONTRIBUTORY SUPPORT
MUST BE CREDIBLE PROGRAM
NO 23% NOT INTERESTED IN FIELD
DECREASED PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES UNDER
CURRENT SYSTEM
RESERVES DON'T BELONG IN ACQUISITION
Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A0, Part 2, Question 8
Question 9. Any other issues (positive or negative)
concerning Naval Reserve participation in Defense Contract
Management?
This question was designed as a catch-all to give the
respondents an opportunity to express whatever thoughts they
may have had that didn't quite fit into one of the previous
questions. Only 24 percent of the respondents took this
opportunity to add to their questionnaires. Some of these
comments were not particularly positive, but are included for
information and to keep other findings in perspective. The
following list includes some of these thoughts/suggestions:
• Contract closeout can't be performed on weekends. Many of
the principals involved (Administrative Contracting
Officer [ACO] , contractor, Defense Finance and Accounting
Service, etc) don't work weekends.
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• Mechanics of contract administration can be taught, but
contractor knowledge and trust of ACO can't -- it's
difficult to become viable member of the DCMD with so
little time and interaction.
• Trying to get qualifications noticed and used is
difficult; no consistent method is available. Need
clearer training plan for junior officers and more
reasonable approach to becoming qualified; that is, relate
the training to the actual job being performed.
• Great upper management support, but little opportunity to
interact with workers.
• Navy must get serious about providing resources and
lengthening assignment duration. Rotation is bad,
frequent turnover is disruptive. Rotation policy and
DAWIA are incompatible.
• Navy unit concept is viable, good for coordination, can
include other Services.
• Mobilization billet qualification is not that important,
should recall become a reality, we could get "up to speed"
fairly quickly in any area the gaining command needed us.
• Need line officers because of expanded role of Program and
Technical Support function. There is also a need for
Judge Advocate General Corps officers.
Part 3 of the questionnaire concentrated on the skills
profiles of the reservists in relation to the certification
requirements of DAWIA. As previously stated in this study,
the applicability of DAWIA to the reservists and their billet
structure is currently undecided. The prevailing opinion is
that it most likely won't be applicable to reservists, now or
in the future. However, inventorying skills with respect to
the certification requirements of DAWIA was considered by this
researcher to be appropriate as it presents an easily
identifiable standard by which personnel qualification
comparisons can be made. A secondary reason for collecting
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these data is that while at least one other Service has
cataloged reserve members skills, the Naval Reserve has yet to
formally profile its members with respect to DAWIA.
Less than half of the reservists (41 percent) qualified to
Level I. The baccalaureate requirements for commission and
the primary training courses required for all DCMD and other
contracting related billets support this standard. Many
reservists were pursuing Level II qualifications, but only a
few (less than 10 percent) had completed the requirements.
These tended to be the individuals who were involved in
Government contracting in their civilian occupations. There
were no respondents who had completed all of the requirements
for Level III. Table 3-11 summarizes the results of the
skills profiles.
B. GAINING COMMAND QUESTIONNAIRES
The gaining command questionnaires (Appendix B) are very
similar in content to the SELRES questionnaires (Appendix A)
,
with the exception of Part 3 . The skill profiles of the
gaining command personnel with whom the reservists interact
were not considered important to this study. Part 1 solicited
general information such as the respondent's command, the
sponsored reserve unit, time at command, time working with
reserves, and current position. The specific command and
sponsored reserve unit were solicited to facilitate a
determination of trends or patterns in responses, and will be
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TABLE 3-11: DAWIA SKILLS PROFILE
DAWIA REQUIREMENTS QUALIFIED
LEVEL I
EXPERIENCE: ONE YEAR OF ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE 73%
EDUCATION: BACCALAUREATE DEGREE (OR 24 HRS OF BUSINESS COURSES) 98%
TRAINING: MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONTRACTS 68%
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT PRICING 41%
LEVEL II
EXPERIENCE: TWO YEARS OF ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE 46%
EDUCATION: SAME AS LEVEL I 98%
TRAINING: GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW 43%
MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONTRACTS (ADVANCED) 24%
ADVANCED CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION 16%
QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR COST/PRICE ANALYSIS 8%
LEVEL III
EXPERIENCE: MINIMUM OF 4 YEARS ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE 35%
EDUCATION: SAME AS LEVEL I 98%
TRAINING: DEFENSE ACQUISITION AND CONTRACTING EXECUTIVE SEMINAR 3%
MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION CONTRACTS (EXECUTIVE) 0%
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION (EXECUTIVE) 3%
ADVANCED CONTRACT PRICING 0%
Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix A), Paft~3*
used during analysis of the data in Chapter IV. Table 3-12
summarizes the longevity responses and representative
positions
.
Part 2 of the questionnaire solicits responses on a number
of questions concerning the type and extent of interaction
with reserve personnel, effectiveness of tasks and duties
assigned and performed, and an open-ended "any other issues"
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question. The survey questions will be addressed
individually.
TABLE 3-12: TIME IN SERVICE/CAPACITY EMPLOYED
CATEGORY MEAN MEDIAN RANGE REPRESENTATIVE POSITIONS








3.3 2.0 .5 - 12.0
Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix B), Par i
Question 1. Please describe your current position and how
you interact with the Naval Reservists. Please list any
pertinent professional affiliations and certifications, i.e.
NCMA/CPCM .
Refer to Table 3-12 for a listing of representative
positions occupied by the respondents. The respondents'
position descriptions as they pertain to reservists were
either obvious from their title or explained by their
interaction with the units. The Commanders' interaction with
reservists takes the form of Management Action Team
participation, planning sessions, and project generation and
reporting out. Individuals involved in military personnel
management interact with the reservists by coordinating
training dates and providing administrative support as needed.
They also provide assistance in translating DLA (non-Navy)
requirements and policies for new reservists. Contracting
Officers and Contract Management personnel interact very
little with the reserve units directly, but provide the bulk
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of the contract administration taskings (closeouts,
termination work, contract controls, reviews, audits,
surveys) , and generate some project work for accomplishment
during AT periods. Likewise, the analysts queried have little
direct contact with the units, but forward suggestions for
reviews, audits, and analytical research projects to liaison
personnel for unit accomplishment. In general, based on the
responses to this question, the reserve units operate fairly
independently, requiring little contact with their gaining
commands aside from periodic assignments, results reporting,
and general direction. This is particularly true for units
that are involved in long-term, comprehensive type projects.
These units know their monthly tasks in advance and,
therefore, place very few administrative burdens on their
gaining commands.
Question 2. Please list the tasks and duties the Naval
Reservists in your area of responsibility are currently
performing that you feel contribute most to the mission of
DCMD .
This question is directly complementary to Question 4 on
the SELRES questionnaire. The purpose of both is to solicit
opinion on what duties and assignments performed by the unit
provide value to the gaining command. For the purpose of
comparison, Table 3-13 summarizes the results of the question
in the same format as that used in Question 4 of the SELRES
survey (Table 3-7) .
The fact that Table 3-7 and Table 3-12 do not agree does
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AUDITING/REVIEWS 20% PROGRESS PAYMENT AUDITS




45% ACCOUNTING SYSTEM DEFICIENCIES













Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix B), Part 2, Question 2
not invalidate either one. The differences are primarily a
function of the different commands and positions of the
respondents . There was some agreement in responses between
particular gaining commands and their affiliated reserve
units. For example, contractor training and orientation was
one of the primary duties for one unit, and was viewed as
providing significant value by both the unit and gaining
command
.
Question 3. Please list any tasks and duties the Naval
Reservists in your area of responsibility are currently
performing that you feel do not contribute to the overall
mission effectiveness of the DCMD .
This question is a companion to Question 5 on the SELRES
survey. Respondents were virtually unanimous in their opinion
that there are no tasks currently performed that do not
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contribute in some way. Only one respondent answered with a
response other than "none," and that was, "I'm not sure."
Question 4. Please list any tasks and duties you are not
currently asking Naval Reservists to perform that you feel
would enhance their contribution to the mission of the
command .
This question is a companion to Question 6 on the SELRES
survey. The responses to Question 6 lent themselves to
summarization in related categories. The responses received
to this question could not be grouped in a like manner since
the responses didn't exactly list tasks or duties for the
units to perform. Some respondents felt that the question
couldn't be appropriately answered without a consensus from
the activities that owned and managed the programs or projects
involved. Others felt that the question didn't quite address
the issue or, more bluntly, was not a meaningful question.
Some suggested a better question might have been to determine
what factors limit the duties or projects being assigned. In
this regard, most respondents mentioned that time,
coordination, and communication problems were the major
limiting factors to making any significant improvements in the
reserve unit's ability to provide value-adding contributory
support. Many indicated that they would like to get the units
more involved in the routine contract administration, quality
assurance, and engineering support functions as a means of
reducing backlogs and providing realistic mobilization billet
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training. One respondent summed up contribution enhancement
as follows:
In reality, a whole new approach to how Naval Reserve
units are utilized in DCMC should be developed. Using
Operation Desert Shield/Storm as an example, it is clearly
evident that Naval Reserve contract administration
personnel mobilization requirements have been diminished.
Their activities should focus on tangible long- lasting
contributions to the command. The amount of time required
to be familiar with the day-to-day issues of various
contract administrative functions does not lend itself
well to the reserve unit schedule. Therefore, activities
should focus on the Command, District, or Area Operations
as a whole rather than functional areas. The benefits of
this approach are more easily measured. This is extremely
important in today's DCMC environment. 5
This response points to a new and more realistic focus and
approach to using reservists, necessitating a change in the
billet structure, unit organization, and qualifications
requirements. Other respondents also generalized that the
present unit structure and focus was not necessarily conducive
to providing the types of support and training desired.
Question 5. To what extent do you feel the experience and
training requirements of DAWIA should apply to Naval
Reservists considering their current duties performed in a
reserve capacity, and what they might be expected to do should
mobilization be ordered ?
This question did not have a companion question in
Appendix A. The purpose of this question was to get an idea
as to how the "trainers" felt about the issue of DAWIA
applicability to the reservists. Most felt that DAWIA
requirements are not essential to the mission of the reserve
units and shouldn't strictly apply, but could be effectively
5Anonymous response to survey question
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used as a guideline. The duties and projects the reservists
normally participate in are rather specific and don't require
well-rounded, comprehensive training. The reservists are more
often than not assigned projects or duties that make use of
their civilian skills as opposed to their military training.
Should mobilization occur, most respondents felt that their
reservists could become fully trained in short order to
fulfill specific surge generated assignments. Table 3-14
summarizes the results of this question.
TABLE 3-14: DAWIA APPLICABILITY
DAW1A APPLICABILITY PERCENTAGE
RESPONDING
DAWIA REQUIREMENTS SHOULD GUIDE TRAINING, BUT NOT BE MANDATORY 22%
TRAIN TO MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS VICE DAWIA REQUIREMENTS 14%
DON'T WORRY ABOUT DAWIA, DOESN'T RELATE TO WHAT RESERVES REALLY DO 42%
NO RESPONSE/NOT SURE 22%
Source: Thesis Questionnaire (Appendix B), Part 2, Question "5
Question 6. Do you feel there are adequate controls in
place to prevent conflicts of interest between your Naval
Reservist's civilian employment and their duties at DCMD? If
inadequate, please indicate suggested controls for future
implementation .
This is a companion question to Question 7 on the SELRES
survey. The purpose of this question is to assess the
perceived possibility of a conflict of interest situation from
the viewpoint of the gaining command personnel. Most (94
percent) of the respondents indicated that controls were
entirely adequate, six percent were not sure. There were no
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responses indicating that controls were considered inadequate.
Controls mentioned consisted of the completion of a
Confidential Statement of Affiliations and Financial Interests
(DD Form 1555) , limiting access to files (paper and
electronic) , and awareness training.
Question 7. Any other issues (positive or negative)
concerning Naval Reserve participation in Defense Contract
Management ?
This question is similar to Question 9 on the SELRES
survey and was intended to give the respondents an opportunity
to express a thought or raise any issue they felt compelled to
voice. Unlike their reserve counterparts, 100 percent of the
gaining command personnel took the opportunity to contribute
responses to this question. One area in which they were in
almost unanimous agreement was that the lack of time was a
significant limiting factor in achieving effective utilization
of their reserve assets. The following list, in no particular
order, is a representative sample of the comments made:
• Reserves should be employed to the fullest, they are a
tremendous asset.
• Better communication, permanent facilities, and longer
tenures are needed. Longer tenures would be of tremendous
value for follow- on reviews and audits. Some Army and Air
Force reservists have been in the same billet for over 10
years.
• Unit members should be close geographically to gaining
commands
.
• Mobilization billet qualification is not particularly
critical as the needed skills can be quickly taught should
full mobilization occur. Rapid learning is facilitated by
the basic knowledge the unit members gain through their
projects and monthly duties.
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• Don't need Naval Reservists in DCMC!
• Contract closeout is impossible to do on the weekends,
most of the team members aren't there.
In summary, responses to both questionnaires tended to be
in general agreement with few drastically different comments.
This indicates a mild consensus of opinion, and will be the
subject of further analysis in Chapter IV. As a closing
remark, the rate of response to the questionnaires was not
particularly great (24.4 percent returned) considering the
high level of stability and cohesiveness of the units





As discussed in Chapter II, the United States has,
throughout history, allowed its armed forces to atrophy in
times of relative calm, only to find that these same forces
must be rapidly reconstituted to meet emergent threats. This
scenario is now threatening to repeat itself. Current
opponents of a large, strong military are using the current
budget climate to demand a significant downsizing of the armed
forces with the resulting savings used for domestic programs.
While most advocates of the military concede the need to
downsize to some extent, they maintain that serious threats
presently exist and will continue to be a factor in the
foreseeable future. The goal, then, is to downsize in a
manner that preserves a level of military might sufficient to
deter or meet aggression, while continuing to operate within
the constraints of a limited budget. This paper has attempted
to show that reserve forces can be viewed as a relatively
inexpensive means of maintaining a trained, rapidly deployable
force. Additionally, using their skills and experience in
providing contributory support, reserve units can partially or
completely offset the costs incurred to maintain the reserve
program. In an effort to determine future roles for one
segment of this force, the DCMC reservists, this chapter will
analyze the literature research presented in Chapter II and
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the survey data presented in Chapter III to outline a picture
of where the units are today, and in what direction they
should be heading.
The research and data will be analyzed and discussed in
three main sections. First, the experience levels and
qualifications of the personnel involved will be examined.
Next, the present employment of unit personnel will be looked
at with general examples of both effective and ineffective
employment presented. Finally, the possibilities for future




One of the central issues in this subject area concerns
the qualifications of the individual reservist to perform
his/her duties at the DCMD . There are several ways to look at
this issue depending upon what tasks the reservist will be
expected to perform. Mobilization billet qualification, the
certification standards of DAWIA, and the formal recognition
and employment of civilian expertise are all factors to
consider. First, viewing qualifications primarily in terms
of the mobilization billet, the Individual Training Plan (ITP)
(Appendix C) precisely outlines the requirements necessary to
achieve full qualification. When the reservists complete
their ITP, they are considered fully qualified to function in
their assigned mobilization billet. How does this relate to
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the certification standards of DAWIA and, more importantly,
how does this relate to their ability to provide contributory
support? Comparing the ITP (Appendix C) with Table 3-11, the
reader will note that mobilization billet qualification is
approximately equivalent to a Level I DAWIA qualification.
Specifically, the ITP lists 13 requirements that must be
completed to qualify for that particular mobilization billet.
Only requirements no. 11 and no. 13, Management of Defense
Acquisition Contracts and Principles of Contract Pricing
respectively, correspond to DAWIA certification requirements
at Level I. The other 11 items consist of indoctrination,
general military training, NOBC qualification, and AT/IDTT
completion. For the ranks and seniority involved, Level I is
a rather low level of qualification, and may be virtually
meaningless depending upon the final outcome of the DAWIA
reserve applicability issue. Additionally, from the data
summarized in Tables 3-7 and 3-13, it is apparent that the
mobilization billets and their qualification standards don't
necessarily relate directly to what the reservists provide in
the way of contributory support. However, lacking other
formal training requirements, mobilization billet
qualification does have value in that it appears to provide a
basic orientation to the language and processes of contract
management. In essence, the focus of any future qualification
effort must be determined by the expected primary role of the
reserve assets. If the mobilization billet remains the
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primary purpose for the unit's existence, then achieving
appropriate ITP qualification should be the overriding
priority. If contributory support becomes the primary purpose
of the unit's existence, then maximum use of the reservist's
available time, knowledge, and skills must be made to achieve
the greatest contribution possible. This would necessitate
deemphasizing mobilization billet qualification as it tends to
encumber the reservist for a year or more while completing the
ITP. Many of the reservists, individually or by unit, are
providing significant contributory support by using their
civilian background and skills (compare Tables 3-3 and 3-7).
The DCMC is, after all, managing contracts awarded to
businesses, and who better to interact with businesses than
businesspersons? Chapter II discussed the advisability and
precedence for this type of interface. Additionally, Tables
3-3, 3-4, and 3-5 reveal that the DCMC reservists have many
years of experience in a wide variety of business (including
acquisition) and technical backgrounds, with many achieving
relatively high positions in their respective fields. This
wealth of experience and skill needs to be utilized. It is an
asset that the Navy, or DCMC for that matter, did not have to
pay for, unlike the training necessary to qualify under the
ITP. Furthermore, individual responses that generated Table
3-4 revealed that over one half of the respondents had some
acquisition related experience, either on active duty, with a
prior reserve unit, and/or in their civilian pursuits. This
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indicates that a large portion of DCMC's reserve assets were
already fluent in the language of contracting before coming
into their billet. Therefore, they can be put to work
immediately using their prior military experience and civilian
skills to provide a value-adding service to the gaining
command.
In summary, with respect to the qualifications of unit
personnel, the following interpretations of the data are
presented:
• Reservists affiliated with the DCMD units are highly
trained and qualified in their respective civilian
pursuits.
• These skills were obtained at little or no cost to the
Government
.
• Many of these skills can be put to use in directly
supporting the mission of the gaining commands.
• The emphasis on future training should be directed at
augmenting the skills already possessed by the reservists,




Before proceeding with an examination of the current
utilization of reserves, it is important to review how the
data were presented. Referring to Table 3-7, the
duties/responsibilities reported by the reservists were broken
up into five categories with a list of representative taskings
cited for each category. Contrary to what would normally be
expected from a DCMC reserve unit, contract administration
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functions accounted for only 16 percent of the responses.
However, closer inspection of the representative taskings
listed in the applicable tables reveals that many of the
duties listed in other categories are also performed at a
DCMD, such as audits, reviews, buy versus lease analysis,
pension plan assessments, etc. The reason for this aberration
is that the taskings listed under contract administration are
duties performed predominantly at a DCMD, whereas, the other
taskings may be performed at a variety of organizations or
businesses and/or lend themselves to separate classification
as they relate to distinct civilian occupations.
As indicated in Table 3-7, reservists are currently being
employed in almost as many different positions as there are
reservists, with each unit showing a distinctly different
focus. Most respondents indicated some satisfaction with
their level of present utilization, as did their respective
gaining command respondents. The reservists' primary
complaint was the fact that Naval Reserve administration
consumed too much time (see Table 3-8) . The gaining command
respondents' primary complaint was that the reservists could
not spend enough time with them to be fully utilized. These
complaints are, no doubt, related; however, addressing the
Naval Reserve administration issue is beyond the scope of this
thesis
.
It was evident from the responses that the units involved
in long-term projects which they had initiated and/or managed
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tended to be the most satisfied with their current
utilization. Units which were fragmented, with individuals
not knowing from month to month what project or task they were
being assigned, tended to show the least satisfaction. From
the gaining command's perspective, units involved in
established, value-adding projects or who performed even
routine functional assignments regularly were recognized as
important assets to the gaining command. Units that were
assigned a wide variety of isolated or unrelated tasks from
drill to drill were looked upon as being of marginal utility
or even unnecessary by some gaining command respondents. It
is also interesting to note that those units which indicated
a good working relationship with their gaining command tended
to fit into the satisfied category. However, those units
which indicated a somewhat strained relationship fit into the
less than satisfied category. There was one unit that
mentioned an abrupt positive turnaround in relations with the
gaining command after they received a new Commanding Officer.
The new CO believed that the reserves had value and showed
support for the program. A final observation is that there is
a high degree of correlation between the units and their
respective gaining commands as to their mutual satisfaction or
dissatisfaction.
This researcher's interpretation of these responses is
that effective reserve asset utilization, now and in the
future, must start with the gaining command upper management.
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They need to show interest in, and support of, the reserve
program before their subordinates will take it seriously and
interact effectively with the unit membership. This must be
achieved before the units can be of value to the gaining
command. Regardless of the skill level and motivation of the
reservists, a disinterested or non- responsive gaining command
probably will not put the unit to work in a meaningful manner.
From another perspective, that of the gaining command, a non-
responsive or inefficient reserve unit will most assuredly
cause a potentially supportive gaining command to lose
interest in the program.
Another aspect this researcher found prevalent throughout
many of the responses was the fact that the opportunity to use
one's civilian skills, applied appropriately to a functional
aspect of contract management, yielded a great deal of
satisfaction for the reservists. Auditors who performed
audits and reviews, attorneys who worked on legal issues,
analysts who analyzed, and software experts who developed and
fine-tuned applications all expressed fulfillment and felt
they provided a meaningful contribution. Responses from their
gaining commands agreed with this assessment. They were
impressed with the expertise of the reservists and felt that
the most meaningful contributions came about when the
reservists used the talents and knowledge that they brought
with them to the billet.
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In summary, with respect to current utilization, the
following interpretations of the gross data are presented:
• Gaining command support is absolutely essential before
effective utilization can be obtained.
• Long-term, meaningful projects conducted by units tended
to yield greater satisfaction for the reservists, and
resulted in greater contributions to the gaining command,
than fragmented taskings given on short notice with no
clear pattern.
• The greatest utility for both parties was achieved when
the reservists were given the opportunity to use their
civilian skills, appropriately applied to the Government
contract administration function.
• Both parties view time constraints as a major limiting
factor in achieving the most effective utilization.
C. FUTURE UTILIZATION
The questionnaires generated a profusion of ideas as to
the most effective future use of reservists. Maximum benefits
will most likely be the result of combining the best of what
they are doing now with the best of what they are or can be
qualified to do, tempered by the needs of the gaining
commands
.
A logical starting point for this discussion is the
applicability of DAWIA and its impact upon the roles of the
reservists affiliated with DCMC. As discussed in Chapter II,
this issue is currently unresolved, but the consensus of
opinion in varying degrees (also see Table 3-14) is that DAWIA
should not apply to reservists for several reasons. First,
few if any reservists have, or could easily attain, the level
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of certification required to perform in a billet commensurate
with their rank and experience. This is apparent from the
results outlined in Table 3-11. Even when all previous
military and civilian acquisition experience is taken into
consideration (summarized in Tables 3-4 and 3-5), less than
half of the reservists can currently be certified at Level I,
and maybe one in ten can be certified at Level II. Based on
the current ITP, Level I is the highest any reservist will
attain unless he/she achieved higher qualifications at
previous commands. This limitation is also applicable to the
many DCMC reservists involved in Quality Assurance (which is
covered separately under DAWIA) as opposed to other contract
administration functions. The length of time it would take to
achieve Level II certification would necessarily be a function
of the background of the individual reservist and the extent
to which the gaining commands would be willing to trade off
contributory support for mobilization billet qualification.
Second, according to both reserve and gaining command
respondents, much of what the reservists will be doing in the
future will be more attuned to their civilian background and
expertise than on specific Service training and mobilization
billet requirements. Table 3-14 summarizes the gaining
command responses on this issue. Clearly, they believe that
DAWIA is not, and will not, be a factor; therefore, it would
be more appropriate to use DAWIA as a convenient guide,
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allowing reserve units to concentrate more on training to
probable duties and responsibilities.
Assuming DAWIA will not apply to reservists, the next area
to analyze is the responses of both the SELRES and gaining
command representatives. In general, the SELRES respondents
saw little change in how they could be more effectively used
in the future from what they are currently doing (compare
Tables 3-7 and 3-9). The ones that were actively involved in
long-term projects or who performed significant functional
duties were content to keep going in that direction. Those
that were not consistently employed expressed interest in
concentrating on various elements of contract administration
in which they, from time to time, were permitted to
participate
.
In analyzing the gaining command responses, it is
interesting to note that they, for the most part, also viewed
present utilization (Table 3-13) as satisfactory for the
future. The gaining commands were more concerned with the
factors that limited future utilization as opposed to any
specific suggestions for more effective employment. If the
coordination problems could be resolved and drains upon the
reservists' time eased, the reserve units could be more
efficiently employed doing essentially what they are doing
now. It is this researcher's interpretation that their
biggest concern was having the opportunity to work with a
stable group of reservists for a period of time sufficient to
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get past mandatory training and to really get involved in
contributory support in either projects or functional areas.
It was generally assumed that the likelihood of ever having to
recall reservists to their mobilization billets was almost
nonexistent. As previously mentioned, only about five percent
of all DLA's reservists were recalled during Operation Desert
Shield/Storm (ODS) , and most of those were activated because
of very specific skills they possessed, not because of their
mobilization billet. Therefore, the gaining command
respondents sent a strong statement to shift the training and
employment focus to providing long-term contributory support
by increasing tour length and reducing the non-productive
claims on the reservists' time. The SELRES echo these
sentiments by referring to the significant time required to
perform non-productive Naval Reserve administrative tasks
(Table 3-8) and their overwhelming support for a structured
acquisition career path (Table 3-10).
In summary, with respect to future utilization, the
following interpretations of the gross data are presented:
• There is no logical way to apply DAWIA to reservists,
other than to possibly use it as a training guide.
• Lengthening unit tours and structuring a formal
acquisition career path are essential to achieving maximum
effectiveness and more universal acceptability of
reservists.
• Future utilization should concentrate more on contributory
support and much less on mobilization billet
qualification. Under today's system, the reservists can't
provide a return on investment until after they qualify
for their billet.
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• Future utilization will look much like current
utilization, only it will be more concentrated and more
structured. Greater consistency will be observed between
various units.
As a closing remark, there are several general patterns of
agreement that became evident during this analysis. First,
most respondents from both sides expressed some level of
approval for the reserve program and viewed the contributions
provided by the units as adding value; however, this consensus
was predicated by the working relationship present between the
unit and gaining command. The working relationship is most
likely the core of effective employment. Second, most
respondents thought there was a future for reserve
participation in the DCMC units, but realized that this
participation must be cost effective. Justifying reserve
expenditures using the mobilization readiness argument is weak
at best. Finally, although only a few respondents
specifically mentioned it, many alluded to the need for a new




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter will present the conclusions and subsequent
recommendations based on the previously presented data,
analysis, and interpretations. Following this, the primary
and secondary research questions will be restated and
addressed with respect to the results of this research effort.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. The reservists currently serving in DCMC units are
highly motivated, educated, and experienced individuals that
represent a significant asset in an era of constrained
resources .
The research has shown that the SELRES officers
affiliated with the DCMC units possess significant active
duty, reserve, and civilian experience and expertise in a wide
variety of acquisition, acquisition related, and general
business disciplines. These skills, while not necessarily
directly applicable to some or all functional positions at the
DCMD unit, can nonetheless be quite valuable to the gaining
command if recognized and used properly. Those gaining
commands that took advantage of these assets were satisfied




Gaining command approval and support is absolutely
essential in achieving effective and efficient employment of
reservists.
The research indicated that those units working with
gaining commands that actively supported them by recognizing
their capabilities and taking their efforts seriously were
more effectively employed than those units operating under
less- than- ideal working relationships with their gaining
command. Although an unmotivated reserve unit can discourage
an otherwise supportive gaining command, effective utilization
of the reserve unit must start with the upper management of
the gaining command.
3 . Gaining command personnel and SELRES alike gain the
greatest utility when legitimate contributory support is asked
of, and provided by, the reserve units.
The research clearly indicated that this was the case
and, combined with the unlikelihood of ever having to recall
the reservists to perform in their specific mobilization
billets, efforts should focus on increasing value-adding
contributory support. Several respondents indicated that,
should the SELRES be needed in wartime, the experience they
have gained through being contributing members of the DCMD
team will adequately prepare them for any foreseeable wartime
tasking.
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4. It would not be advisable to apply DAWIA to Naval
Reservists, except possibly as a guide in developing training.
The research has shown that very few, if any, SELRES
could attain DAWIA certification at a level commensurate with
their rank. Although not requiring SELRES to qualify under
DAWIA may appear to be a double -standard, the emphasis on
contributory support based more on the unique talents of the
individual reservists will justify this stance. However,
using DAWIA as a training guide would ensure a common, minimum
level of basic acquisition knowledge to facilitate
communication and interaction.
5. Naval Reservists' billet tenure is too short for them
to achieve maximum effectiveness in the DCMD unit.
The research clearly indicated that short billet
tenures was perceived as a significant problem by both the
reservists and their gaining commands. Unlike their Air Force
and Army counterparts who spend five to ten years with the
same gaining command, Naval Reservists usually serve only two
to four years in a particular unit billet. This provides
little more than enough time to become fully mobilization
billet qualified, particularly if the reservist had little or
no applicable experience or training prior to transferring
into the billet. Contributory support is traditionally
reserved until one is mobilization billet qualified. A
related problem is the drain on drill time caused by Naval
Reserve administrative requirements. On some drill weekends,
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the reservist finds that he/she has little or no time left to
devote to functional training or contributory support. All




1. An acquisition/contracting career path should be
established within the Naval Reserve.
As previously alluded to in this study, acquisition is
a very complex and varied discipline. The other Services have
grasped this concept and typically leave their IMA reservists
in billet for five or more years. This length of tenure
allows complete training in the functional areas and permits
the development of familiarity with the peculiarities of the
individual offices, customers, or positions. Most
respondents, both SELRES and gaining commands alike, indicated
that a longer tenure in a particular reserve unit, and the
acquisition field in general, was most desirable. The only
real obstacle is the perception that remaining in one billet,
unit, or specialty too long is detrimental to professional
development and promotion opportunities. The often stated
requirement that senior Supply Corps officers should be
"generalists" to be promotable forces reservists and reserve
management personnel to rotate incumbents every two to four
years, frequently transferring officers to completely
different types of units to broaden their professional
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experience. Structured acquisition career paths work in the
civilian business community and within the other Services.
Therefore, a plan to legitimize an acquisition career path
with comparable promotion opportunities should be formulated
and implemented. This plan should be accompanied with
sufficient "advertising" to update attitudes and change
perceptions
.
2. Establish contributory support as the primary goal of
the reserve unit, with attainment of mobilization billet
qualifications as a secondary goal.
The research has shown that both parties, SELRES and
gaining command alike, recognize the need to make use of all
resources and assets, including reservists, in this era of
increasingly scarce resources. Both parties also recognize
the unlikelihood of ever being recalled to fill their
mobilization billets, and, even if mobilization was ordered,
both parties maintain that the reservists could step-in and
become viable members of the organization in short order.
Therefore, the most cost effective and logical employment of
reservists is to give them the opportunity to provide value-
adding contributions to their gaining commands. As one
gaining command respondent succinctly stated, this will
require a new attitude concerning why the reservists' exist,
and a revised approach to how the units are structured, how
training is conducted, and how value and readiness is
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measured. 6 Whether or not mobilization billet qualification
remains the primary goal, reserve units of the future should,
in any case, be capable of justifying their existence through
an impartial cost/benefit analysis.
3. Revise ITPs using DAWIA requirements as a guide, and
show preference for billet assignments based on previously
attained DAWIA requirement satisfaction.
The research has indicated that it would be illogical
to attempt to formally apply DAWIA to reservists; however,
many respondents and literature sources alike concede that
DAWIA does represent a more than adequate guideline for
establishing basic training requirements and long-range
training plans, and assessing a reservist's qualifications for
various billets. By showing preference to individual
reservists who have attained a portion of the DAWIA
certification requirements, reserve units will not be forced
to start training individuals from scratch and possibly
disrupting a unit's efforts at providing support. This is not
meant to exclude those without prior experience, but with the
successful implementation of a structured career path and
subsequently longer tenures in billet, there should be no
shortage of qualified or near-qualified officers ready to fill
the various billets available.
^Refer to p. 62.
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C. SUMMARY
This section of the chapter specifically addresses the
primary and subsidiary research questions, and offers
suggestions for further research based on the findings of this
thesis
.
1. Primary Research Question.
a. What is the most effective way in which Navy
Selected Reserve personnel can be utilized in Defense Contract
Management Command reserve units?
Reservists can most effectively be utilized by
taking full advantage of their varied skills and knowledge
acquired through prior active duty service, reserve
assignments, and extensive civilian business experience. De-
emphasizing strict mobilization billet qualification
requirements, streamlining non-productive Naval Reserve
administrative requirements, and focusing attention and
resources on providing value-adding contributory support is
also a means to this end. This will require a positive
attitude and firm commitment from DCMD management, along with
a concerted effort by Naval Reserve leadership to reassess the
mission of various reserve elements along with eliminating
non-productive administrative and general military training




2. Subsidiary Research Questions.
a. To what extent are Selected Reserve personnel
currently being utilized in the DCMC units?
The employment of Naval Reservists varies
significantly from unit to unit. Some units are deeply
involved in long-term projects, some units disperse members to
work with individual functional areas or offices on a routine
basis, and other units seem to muddle through from one drill
to the next. The predominant deciding factor is the attitude
of the affiliated DCMD office with regards to their desire to
take advantage of the reserve assets at their disposal.
Offices with positive working relationships have their reserve
units involved in projects and functional taskings that have
reduced administrative burdens for the regular employees.
Offices with strained working relationships tend to
haphazardly assign projects to occupy their units during drill
weekends and AT periods. These projects may, or may not, add
value to the organization, but certainly don't provide the
return that planned projects and well-thought-out functional
taskings provide. A secondary factor in the effective
employment of reservists is the attitudes of the unit members
and their respective skills and experience levels. Both




jb. What functions can Selected Reserve personnel
perform that they are not currently performing?
In general, reservists are currently performing
most of the functions that anyone surveyed would expect them
to perform, now or in the future. The predominant response
with regards to this question is not what functions can be
performed, but how can more time be allotted to perform the
currently assigned functions. This involves eliminating non-
productive duties and responsibilities, reorganizing the
reserve elements to facilitate their interaction with the
gaining command, and reassessing the priorities of the various
roles the unit will be expected to fulfill.
c. How will the mandatory training requirements in
DoD Directive 5000.52 impact the Selected Reservist' s ability
to fully qualify for their positions and perform in these
billets in the future?
The training requirements cited in DODD 5000.52
are not, and probably will not be, mandatory for the
reservists, but should serve as a guide in determining the
reservists' mobilization billet qualifications. Current ITPs
are roughly in line with Level I certification, and it is not
inconceivable to envision at least partial completion of Level
II certification for most reservists. How it will impact
their ability to perform in their respective billets is
currently more a factor of the individual gaining command's
employment of their reserve assets.
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d. What is the impact of the Defense Acquisition
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) on the designation of
acquisition billets in the Selected Reserve?
The billets currently occupied by reservists
essentially mirror positions filled by active duty or civilian
Government employees. However, DAWIA billet designation is
rather specific, and, at this point, no reserve billets have
been designated as acquisition billets. Additionally, from
the sources investigated and reported in Chapter II, it
doesn't appear likely that any reserve billets will be so
designated.
e. Does the present training and career path
within the DCMC units fulfill qualification requirements of
other reserve acquisition billets?
The training and career path progression
currently offered in DCMC affiliated units will only partially
fulfill qualification requirements of other acquisition
related reserve billets, depending upon the particular billet
the reservist is occupying. The majority of DCMC reserve unit
training is focused towards Contract Administration (NOBC
1485) which is only one segment of acquisition. A large
percentage of the DCMC billets are also involved in Quality
Assurance or other functional areas (NOBCs 7435 and 7445) and
may or may not fulfill requirements levied under other
acquisition billets. However, despite the fact that the DCMC
reservist may not necessarily be able to step into a Naval
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Regional Contracting Center or other such unit and be fully
qualified, that reservist does possess a rudimentary-
background in acquisition and is familiar with the various
aspects of the field. If a structured career path were in
place that allowed officers to migrate from one acquisition
billet to another without stopping to become a generalist, it
would not take very long before a trained cadre of officers
were available that could easily step from one unit to another
and be fully qualified from the outset. Under today's push to
vary experience, a reservist may serve only one or two
isolated tours in acquisition, never quite attaining a level
of proficiency.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study only briefly touched upon the present and
future employment of reserves. In broad terms, this
researcher attempted to assess the contributions provided by
the DCMC affiliated reservists by looking at their vast and
varied experiences, both military and civilian, and the fact
that some gaining commands are quite satisfied with the
contributions and support the reserves are providing.
However, any position taken as a result of this research
should be viewed primarily as a point of departure for further
analysis as the conclusions were derived from a relatively
small sampling. Additionally, the individual nature of each
DCMD unit and gaining command may prohibit universal
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application. With these limitations in mind, the following
specific areas lend themselves to further research:
• A cost/benefit analysis should be conducted to determine
if the DCMC affiliated reserve units are providing
contributory support to the extent that they are cost
effective. If the unit is found to be cost effective,
future existence could be justified regardless of any
possible mobilization role.
• Investigate the feasibility of restructuring at least a
portion of the DCMC reservists into flexible, mobile
groups of experts qualified and ready to tackle a variety
of problem areas as needed, without regard to mobilization
billet training or assignment. This concept, the
consulting group approach, was mentioned by several survey
respondents as a possible way to fill a specific need for
technical expertise.
• Investigate the feasibility of separating the DCMC
reservists and units from the Naval Reserve administrative
chain of command. This would mirror what occurs when an
active duty member is transferred to a DLA command, and
would allow units to devote more time to their
contributory support efforts.
As long as there are reserve forces, someone will be
asking whether or not they are useful or even needed at all.
With some units, justification is easy. With others, it will
become increasingly difficult to present a convincing case,
especially as budgets and manpower resources are forced to
shrink. The DCMC units currently fall into this latter
category. Only a very few individuals from DCMC units were
recalled during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, and the end of
the Cold War drastically reduces the possibility of a
prolonged conflict, the type that would require mobilization
of acquisition support resources. To survive in the future,
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these units must "hang their hats" on something other than
mobilization. The SELRES and DCMC respondents alike indicated
that value -adding contributory support that makes full use of
the reservist's combined military and civilian expertise is
the direction for the future.
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APPENDIX A
Dear Fellow Supply Corps Officer;
The purpose of this letter is to introduce myself, and to
request your assistance. I am Lieutenant Commander Mike
Colesar, a TAR Supply Corps officer currently enrolled in the
Acquisition and Contract Management curriculum at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. My thesis research
concerns the utilization of Naval Reserve personnel within the
Defense Contract Management Command. The assistance I request
from you is in completing the attached questionnaire.
Part 1 will be used to develop a very general picture of the
officer currently serving at the DCMDs . Part 2 will be used
to develop a more focused assessment of the skills and
experience of officers serving in the DCMD units, and to find
out what you really like and/or dislike about your current
duties. It also addresses the issues of conflict of interest
and your interest in pursuing a more structured acquisition
career path.
The Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991 included the Defense
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) . It was passed in response
to perceived deficiencies in the acquisition workforce within
DoD. Among other provisions, it mandates minimum requirements
for experience, training, and education for everyone serving
in an acquisition position in DoD to be fully implemented by
1 October 1993. The act currently applies only to active duty
military and DoD civilian personnel. Part 3 of the survey is
designed to see where the individual reservist assigned to a
DCMD unit stands in relation to these new requirements.
I have provided a questionnaire, similar in content to the
reserve officer survey, for your "active duty counterpart" to
complete. Please have the DCMC individual (military or
civilian) whom you work with, or interact with to the greatest
extend, complete this questionnaire and return to me in the




This research is sponsored by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, (Research, Development, and
Acquisition) (OASN (RD&A.) ) , and is follow- on research to that
previously conducted by LCDR Jim Ross concerning utilization
of reserve personnel at Naval Regional Contracting Centers.






SMC Box 2 757
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
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Time in Unit Years: Active Duty Drilling Reserve
Current civilian occupation
(Note: Please use additional paper if required for a complete
answer.
)
Part 2 : Experience
1. Please list all contracting related positions you have held in
your capacity as a civilian, active duty officer, and reserve
officer; and summarize your duties, responsibilities, and length of
time you held each position. Please list any professional
affiliations and certifications that apply, i.e. NCMA/CPCM.
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2. Have you earned one of the following Navy Officer Billet
Classification (NOBC) Codes?
NOBC Yes No
1476 - Procurement Management Officer
1480 - Procurement Contracting Officer
1485 - Administrative Contracting Officer
3. If you answered yes to any of the NOBC's listed above, please
describe the basis upon which it was granted.
4. Please list the tasks and duties you are currently performing
during your IDT/IDTT/AT that you feel contribute most to the
mission of the DCMD.
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5. Please list any tasks and duties you are currently performing
during your IDT/IDTT/AT that you feel do not contribute to the
overall mission effectiveness of the DCMD (i.e. any make- work
assignments? )
.
6. Please list any tasks and duties you are not currently asked to
perform that you feel you have the requisite experience and skills
to perform, and that would enhance your contribution to the mission
of the unit.
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7. Do you feel there are adequate controls in place to prevent
conflicts of interest between your civilian employment and your
duties at DCMD? If inadequate, please indicate suggested controls
for future implementation.
8. If a structured acquisition career path were available, would
you choose to continue to pursue billets in the field? Why or why
not?
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9. Any other issues (positive or negative) concerning Naval
Reserve participation in Defense Contract Management?
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Part 3 : DAWIA Requirements
1. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) has
mandated specific experience, education, and training requirements
for all persons serving in acquisition related positions within
DoD. They have been divided into three career levels -- Basic
Level Development (Level I) ; Intermediate Level Development (Level
II) ; and Senior Level Development (Level III) . Please indicate
below whether or not you have met the listed requirements.
Level I Typical Grade - - 01 to 03
Assignments -- Contract Specialist
Experience: One year of acquisition experience YES
Education: As of 1 Oct 93 must have a Baccalaureate YES
degree, OR 24 semester hours in any of the
disciplines: accounting, business, finance,
law, contracts, purchasing, economics,
industrial mgmt, marketing, quantitative
methods, and organization and management.
NO
NO
Training: 1. Management of Defense Acquisition
Contracts (Basic) (8D-4320 ( JT)
)
2. Principles of Contract Pricing








Typical Grade - - 03/04
Assignments -- Contract Specialist; Contract
Administrator; Contract Cost/Price Analyst;
Contracting Officer
Two years of contracting experience in





Same as Level I
Government Contract Law (PPM 302 (JT) )
(All Level II personnel)
Management of Defense Acquisition
Contracts (Advanced) (8D F12 ( JT) ) (If
job is primarily Pre-Award oriented)
Advanced Contract Administration
(PPM 304 ( JT) ) (If job is primarily
Post-Award oriented)
Quantitative Techniques for Cost and
Price Analysis (QMT 345 (JT) ) (If job







YES NO5. Defense Contracting for Information
Resources (ALMC-ZX) (If involved in
acquisition of Information Resources)
Level III Typical Grade - - 04 and above
Assignments -- Senior Contracting Official; Procurement




Minimum of 4 years contracting experience in an
acquisition position of increasing
complexity and responsibility. YES NO
Same as Level I
Training: 1. Defense Acquisition and Contracting
Executive Seminar (2 ER (JT) ) (All
Level III personnel)
2. Management of Defense Acquisition
Contracts (Executive) (ALMC-B5 (JT)
)
(If job is primarily Pre- Award oriented)
3. Contract Administration (Executive)
(PPM 057 (JT) ) (If job is primarily
Post -Award oriented)
4. Advanced Contract Pricing (QMT 540 (JT) )














Part 1 : General
Your Command
Sponsored Reserve Unit_
Time in Command Time Working with Naval Reservists
Current Position




Part 2 : Experience
1. Please describe your current position and how you interact with
Naval Reservists. Please list any professional affiliations and
certifications that are pertinent, i.e. NCMA/CPCM.
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2. Please list the tasks and duties the Naval Reservists in you
area of responsibility are currently performing that you feel
contribute most to the mission of DCMD.
3. Please list any tasks and duties the Naval Reservists in your
area of responsibility are currently performing that you feel do
not contribute to the overall mission effectiveness of the DCMD.
102
4. Please list any tasks and duties you are not currently asking
Naval Reservists to perform that you feel would enhance their
contribution to the mission of the command.
5. To what extent do you feel the experience and training
requirements of DAWIA should apply to Naval Reservists considering
their current duties performed in a reserve capacity, and what they
might be expected to do should mobilization be ordered?
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6. Do you feel there are adequate controls in place to prevent
conflicts of interest between your Naval Reservist's civilian
employment and their duties at DCMD? If inadequate, please
indicate suggested controls for future implementation.
7. Any other issues (positive or negative) concerning Naval
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